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Selective breeding of plants has been one of
the most signiﬁcant achievements of human
civilization; it has resulted in major agro-
nomic improvements and in an ability to
adequately provide food to large human
populations. Conventional plant breeding
involves genetic manipulation via crosses of
sexually compatible plants and selection for
the offspring that have desirable characteris-
tics (such as fruit quantity and quality, pest
resistance, and agricultural requirements).
More recently, conventional plant breeding
has also involved use of technologies such as
irradiation that randomly induce mutations
that can allow plant breeders to select for
new, desirable traits. Biotechnology-based
breeding involves direct transfer of specific
genetic information in its pure DNA form;
unlike radiation, it is a selective process, in
that the desired trait and the genetic code
that expresses the protein responsible for the
trait have been identified and characterized
in the parent organism. The process of gene
transfer often involves modification of the
transferred DNA for better functioning in
the new host. Because only a well-character-
ized segment of DNA is transferred, biotech-
nology-based breeding is considered to be
more precise than conventional breeding,
which involves many uncharacterized linked
genes. Nonetheless, uncertainties still sur-
round genomic alterations due to the inser-
tion site of the DNA (which is random) and
metabolic changes due to the new proteins
expressed (which are difﬁcult to predict).
A report of an international academy of
sciences panel on biotechnology in agricul-
ture recently concluded that 
foods can be produced through the use of GM
[genetic modiﬁcation] technology that are more
nutritious, stable in storage, and in principle
health promoting—bringing benefits to con-
sumers in both industrialized and developing
nations (1; p.1). 
At the same time, they also said,
public health regulatory systems need to be put
in place in every country to identify and monitor
any potential adverse human health effects of
transgenic plants, as for any other new [plant]
variety (1; p. 2).
The bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt)
has been known for decades to elaborate tox-
ins that have insecticidal properties.
Preparations of whole Bt have been used by
farmers as an insecticidal spray for control of
lepidopteran and coleopteran insects for at
least 30 years (2). Most of the Bt toxins
belong to the Cry (crystal) protein family.
Cry toxins are elaborated in crops that con-
tain Bt genes; to date such crops include
corn, cotton, and potato. One of such pro-
teins is Cry9c; it has been incorporated into a
corn variety that has the trade name Starlink
(Aventis CropScience, Research Triangle
Park, NC). Starlink and other transformed, or
transgenic, crops have thus acquired insectici-
dal properties. They have been termed plant-
pesticides, genetically modiﬁed pest-protected
plants, and most recently, plant-incorporated
protectants (PIP). To date, the economically
most important PIP crops are Bt-modified
plants, or Bt crops.
The U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (U.S. EPA) 1998 registration for
Starlink was restricted to use as animal feed
and excluded consumption as food. In
September 2000, the media reported that
Starlink somehow had found its way into the
food supply (3); in a few days, a major food
company initiated voluntary recalls (4). In
early October, the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) confirmed that
Starlink corn was intermingled with corn in
the food chain, and by the beginning of
November the FDA reported recalls of sev-
eral products (5), with others soon to follow.
In the United States, risks of genetically
modified foods are assessed and managed
under various statutes that have the intent of
assuring that new technologies meet safety
standards, which vary according to statute.
These legal authorities grew up during differ-
ent eras and under various congressional
committees and agencies, so that they consti-
tute a patchwork that has been held together
via a White House “Coordinated Framework
on Biotechnology” that was published in
1986 (6). 
Risks related to PIPs are in the jurisdic-
tion of three agencies, the U.S. EPA, the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the
FDA. Table 1 illustrates the legal authorities
of these federal agencies and the roles of key
international authorities. Of note is that the
U.S. regulatory process is in ﬂux (as assessed
by the number of recent modifications to
policies and rules). The three agencies operate
under separate statutes and under the over-
sight of different committees of Congress.
They coordinate their efforts under the 1986
White House Coordinated Biotechnology
Framework (6). The U.S. EPA is the federal
agency that evaluates and licenses pesticides
under FIFRA [Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
Rodenticide Act (7)] and FFDCA [Federal
Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics Act (8)]. For
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Commentaries
Modern biotechnology has dramatically increased our ability to alter the agronomic traits of
plants. Among the novel traits that biotechnology has made available, an important group
includes Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt)-derived insect resistance. This technology has been applied to
potatoes, cotton, and corn. Beneﬁts of Bt crops, and biotechnology generally, can be realized only
if risks are assessed and managed properly. The case of Starlink corn, a plant modiﬁed with a gene
that encodes the Bt protein Cry9c, was a severe test of U.S. regulatory agencies. The U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency had restricted its use to animal feed due to concern about the
potential for allergenicity. However, Starlink corn was later found throughout the human food
supply, resulting in food recalls by the Food and Drug Administration and signiﬁcant disruption
of the food supply. Here we examine the regulatory history of Starlink, the assessment framework
employed by the U.S. government, assumptions and information gaps, and the key elements of
government efforts to manage the product. We explore the impacts on regulations, science, and
society and conclude that only significant advances in our understanding of food allergies and
improvements in monitoring and enforcement will avoid similar events in the future. Speciﬁcally,
we need to develop a stronger fundamental basis for predicting allergic sensitization and reactions
if novel proteins are to be introduced in this fashion. Mechanisms are needed to assure that
worker and community aeroallergen risks are considered. Requirements are needed for the devel-
opment of valid assays so that enforcement and post market surveillance activities can be con-
ducted. Key words: allergens, biotechnology, corn, food hypersensitivity, pesticides, risk
assessment. Environ Health Perspect 110:5–13 (2002). [Online  10 December 2001]
http://ehpnet1.niehs.nih.gov/docs/2002/110p5-13bucchini/abstract.htmlPIPs, the scrutiny of the U.S. EPA encom-
passes environmental risks and human
health concerns, though it is limited to the
pesticidal substances (the inserted DNA and
the proteins it produces). The USDA, under
the Plant Protection Act [PPA (9)], regulates
all genetically modiﬁed plants that have pest
potential. The FDA, given its authority over
food safety, oversees all genetically modiﬁed
plants under the FFDCA that are grown for
food or animal feed (8). The FDA also mon-
itors the residues of pesticides in food, thus
ensuring their compliance with levels that
the U.S. EPA has deemed safe, which are
called “tolerances.”
As shown in Table 1, the current legal
framework consists of various rules and poli-
cies concerning PIP that have been published
by the U.S. EPA, the USDA, and the FDA.
The USDA issued the first rule, in 1987
(modified in 1997) (10), which requires a
review of new plants that the USDA will no
longer regulate if the plants are judged to be
safe for the environment. Also in 1987, the
National Academy of Sciences (11) published
a white paper that advised the U.S. govern-
ment to regulate biotechnology based on risk
and not based on the application of a new
technology per se. The U.S. EPA proposed a
rule in 1994 (12–14), modified in 1997,
which was finalized in 2001. It was with-
drawn from publication in the Federal
Register on 20 January 2001 (15). The ﬁnal
regulation was published in July 2001, along
with a call for comments pertaining to pro-
posed exemptions that were dropped from the
ﬁnal rule (16). Despite this prolonged rule-
making effort, the U.S. EPA gave the ﬁrst full
approval for commercialization of a pest-pro-
tected plant in 1994. In 1992 the FDA pub-
lished a policy statement in which it
established a process for voluntary consulta-
tion with industry over these products (17);
in 2000, it proposed a rule that would require
mandatory review of new genetically modiﬁed
plants (18). In 1999, Congress asked the
National Research Council (NRC) to review
this biotechnology assessment framework,
particularly with respect to PIPs; the NRC
published its report in early 2000 (19).
The Starlink episode can be viewed as a
severe test of the framework for risk assess-
ment and management of plant-incorporated
protectants, both for the U.S. EPA and for
the Coordinated Framework. In this paper
we analyze these processes in terms of science
and regulatory policy to contribute to the
dialogue about regulation of genetically mod-
ified crop plants. Such an analysis may be
useful for suggesting areas where further
reform of biotechnology regulation might be
considered. This is particularly timely in that
the three agencies, the U.S. EPA, the FDA,
and the USDA, are currently in a process of
reexamining their policies on biotechnology
plants. Because the major controversies in the
case of Starlink were over adequacy of protec-
tion of human health, this paper concerns
only the human safety aspect of assessing and
regulating biotechnology. 
Chronology
The saga of Starlink corn occurred over a 5-
year period between 1997 and 2001 (Table
2). However, it should be noted that the ﬁrst
strain of Bt corn to be marketed in the
United States was based on Cry1Ab and was
approved for human consumption in 1995
(20). Until spring 2001 only, another Cry
toxin (Cry1Ac) was approved thereafter as
an active ingredient of transgenic corn
intended for human consumption (21).
Although the technology to induce endoge-
nous production of Bt in plants was then
novel, the U.S. EPA was familiar with Bt
toxins because it had issued several registra-
tions for Bt sprays and extracts. From the
standpoint of human health, the U.S. EPA
has considered Bt sprays to be safe—so safe
that it has exempted them from the require-
ment of a tolerance (a standard for a maxi-
mum allowable residue limit on food) and
thus exempted them from FDA enforcement
requirements. This means that foods con-
taining residues of Bt would not be consid-
ered by the FDA to be adulterated, even
though no tolerance was established. All of
the Bt plant registrations issued by the U.S.
EPA have followed suit; that is, in no case
has a tolerance been required (21).
In 1997, Plant Genetic Systems, a com-
pany that is now part of Aventis CropScience,
applied to the U.S. EPA for approval of a reg-
istration under FIFRA for Starlink corn for
food use. At the same time, it petitioned the
U.S. EPA for an exemption under the
FFDCA from the requirement of a tolerance
for residues of Cry9c in food and feed (22).
The U.S. EPA published the petition for tol-
erance exemption for public comment and
received no comments. Later that year,
Aventis modiﬁed the application for registra-
tion to request approval of Starlink for ani-
mal feed but not for human consumption;
this application was granted in 1998, and the
tolerance exemption was published as a ﬁnal
rule (Table 2) (23). In 1999, the U.S. EPA
denied an application to expand the registra-
tion to include food uses (24). At that time,
the U.S. EPA asked its Scientific Advisory
Panel (SAP) for advice on the review of
Starlink. Meanwhile, the USDA approved
(“unregulated”) Starlink in 1998, after receiv-
ing 2,271 letters from farmers in support of
Starlink (25,26). In the same period, the
FDA reviewed the other food safety aspects
and considered its consultation with the
company completed (18).
The regulatory history of Starlink before
its occurrence in the food supply suggests
that the U.S. EPA had decided to proceed
with caution. Such caution is reflected in
Starlink being the first Bt pest-protected
plant to receive an animal-feed–only regis-
tration. Once Starlink residues were detected
in the food supply, in the fall of 2000, the
company withdrew the registration. At the
same time, it petitioned the U.S. EPA for a
time-limited approval for food uses to make
legal the Starlink corn that was inadvertently
present in the food supply. These efforts
continued into 2001 with additional data
submittals by Aventis. In July 2001, the U.S.
EPA FIFRA SAP once again was asked for
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Table 1. U.S. federal agencies and selected international entities with legal authority in regulating geneti-
cally modiﬁed plants.
Agency Authority Speciﬁc regulations Responsibility
White House Executive Coordinated framework Coordination of federal
activities
USDA PPA 7 CFR 340 New pests; 
environmental impact
U.S. EPA FFDCA, FIFRA FFDCA rules Plant incorporated 
FIFRA rules protectants (health and
environmental risk)
FDA FFDCA 1992 Statement of policy Whole foods
2000 Proposed policiesa Risk to human health
EUb EC Treaty (art. 100a) Directive 90/220/ECa Environmental risks
EUb EC Treaty (art. 100a) EC 258/97 Food risks and labeling
EC 1139/98
Reg. 49/2000a
UN Biodiversity Convention Biosafety Protocol Interboundary 
movement of LMOs
Codex FAO In process Labeling; human
health
Abbreviations: EC, European Community; EU, European Union; FAO, U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization; FFDCA,
Federal Food, Drugs and Cosmetics Act; FIFRA, Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act; LMO, living modiﬁed
organism; PPA, Plant Protection Act. 
aNew rules proposed. bThe decisions are taken by an individual member state regulatory agency and valid throughout the
union if no member state objects; in the case of objections, they are taken at the European level and involve the European
Commission.advice. At this stage, the SAP concluded that
it could not identify a safe level for Cry9c in
the food supply. It recommended that the
U.S. EPA continue efforts to remove
Starlink corn from the food supply (27). At
this stage, it appears highly unlikely that
there will be an approval for Cry9c in food.
Risk Assessment 
In the case of PIPs, as for other pesticides
covered under the FFDCA, the legal stan-
dard for safety is “a reasonable certainty of no
harm” under the Food Quality Protection
Act (28). In other words, the U.S. EPA must
be able to make a judgment that no one will
be harmed by the occurrence of the pesticide
residue on food. Product-specific data are
developed by companies (registrants), gener-
ally under protocols designed by the U.S.
EPA in consultation with the scientiﬁc com-
munity. These protocols generally rely on
both in vivo and in vitro toxicology testing.
Risk assessments are conducted by the U.S.
EPA. For a chemical pesticide in food, the
U.S. EPA generally assesses acute toxicity,
mutagenicity, reproductive and developmen-
tal toxicity, subchronic toxicity, chronic toxi-
city, neurotoxicity, and oncogenicity. In the
case of PIPs, whose pesticidal properties are
conferred by DNA and proteins, the U.S.
EPA has tailored the hazard identification
process to the characteristics of these com-
pounds, thus reducing the testing to the
safety concerns that the U.S. EPA has con-
cluded are warranted.
Both the U.S. EPA and the FDA have
concluded that DNA, as a food component,
is inherently safe, and they therefore have
not subjected DNA to testing. Although
proteins are a normal component of food,
there are many proteins that are toxic. These
include bacterial toxins (e.g., botulinum
toxin), components of snake poisons, and
plant toxins. The U.S. EPA and the FDA
consider that known toxic proteins in food
act via acute mechanisms at very low dose lev-
els; chronic health impacts, or other adverse
effects, are not considered likely. Toxic pro-
teins are regulated with a zero risk approach
by the FDA, meaning that the policy is that
no tolerance may be established (29) because
of their great potency. Thus, in assessment of
PIPs, the U.S. EPA has required companies to
conduct high-dose acute toxicity assays. This
maximum hazard dose approach has been
endorsed by the U.S. EPA SAP (30).
Beyond acute toxicity, the U.S. EPA is
also concerned about the potential for
adverse immune effects of proteins, especially
food allergy. Unfortunately, proteins that are
allergens do not have properties that com-
pletely differentiate them from other pro-
teins. Allergens interact with the immune
system in a two-step process: sensitization
and allergic reactions. Allergic reactions are
associated with a spectrum of adverse effects.
In young children, food allergy can cause
chronic diarrhea and adversely impact nutri-
tional status and growth. Food allergy can
also cause acute allergic reactions, called ana-
phylaxis. Severe anaphylaxis can cause shock
(anaphylactic shock)—severe respiratory and
cardiovascular symptoms that can result in
death. One study estimated that as many as
8,300 cases of anaphylactic shock from all
causes occur in the United States each year,
and that about 415 result in death (31). Bock
et al. (32) estimated, based on a study by
Yocum et al. (33), that each year 29,000 food
allergy-related anaphylactic episodes (includ-
ing anaphylactic shock) occur in the United
States, with 150 associated deaths. The
prevalence of food allergy in the general pop-
ulation is not known precisely; it is estimated
at 1–2% in the general population and up to
5% in the pediatric population (34). 
PIPs are of concern from the standpoint
of allergenicity for two reasons. First, genetic
modiﬁcation could theoretically create unin-
tended changes in the plant, which could
result in expression of new allergens or in
increased expression of endogenous aller-
gens. This potential hazard has not been a
concern for Starlink. Second, the protein, or
proteins, purposely expressed as a conse-
quence of genetic modification could be
allergenic. In the first scenario, the protein
could be a known allergen derived from
another food. The development of a more
nutritious, methionine-rich soy variety was
halted when immunologic assays revealed
that human sera from Brazil nut-allergic
patients were reacting to the new Brazil nut
protein that was introduced into the soy
(35). Under the second scenario, the protein
is novel to the food supply. In that case, no
testing material would be available from
human populations to identify the allergen
before it is introduced into the food supply.
Consequently the theoretical potential
risk of allergenicity of biotech crops has been
under consideration since 1992 (17). In
1994, the FDA, the U.S. EPA, and the
USDA sponsored a meeting that developed
tentative guidelines for allergenicity assess-
ment. In 1996, a science consensus paper
(36) deﬁned an allergenicity assessment deci-
sion tree that has formed the core of the
approach used by the FDA and the U.S.
EPA. Figure 1 illustrates the part of the deci-
sion tree that is relevant to the identiﬁcation
of a new allergen in the food supply. Using
this framework, assessment of allergenicity is
addressed with stability studies and amino
acid sequence analysis. It is generally
believed that proteins easily degraded by gas-
tric juices or by food processing are less
likely to cause sensitization and allergic reac-
tions, although exceptions exist (37). Based
on this rationale, studies of simulated gastric
fluids and heat stability are used to deter-
mine whether the protein would be available
to interact with the immune system (37).
Amino acid sequence analysis is used to
search protein databases for sequences that
are similar to known allergens, or that share
epitopes with known allergens. Proteins that
fail to produce these matches are considered
less likely to be food allergens. However, the
U.S. EPA’s FIFRA SAP has identiﬁed some
uncertainties in such analyses (30). 
One issue that the U.S. EPA does not
address is the potential for allergy via the
inhalation route of exposure. Allergens in
grains and other foods are known to cause
occupational asthma or rhinitis (38), particu-
larly in workers in silos and bakeries. Cases of
occupational allergies to Bt products have
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Table 2. Key events in the regulation of Starlink corn by EPA and FDA. 
Date Event Authority
August 1997 Aventisa petition to register Starlink FIFRA
September 1997 Aventisa petition for all uses  FFDCA
November 1997 Aventisa petition for feed use only  FFDCA
April 1998 EPA: Feed use only granted (temporary) FIFRA
May 1998 EPA: Feed use only (permanent) FIFRA
August 1998 EPA: Starlink registeredb FIFRA
April 1999 Aventisa new petition for all uses FFDCA
February 2000 First Starlink SAP FIFRA, FFDCA
April 2000 EPA: Registration updated and extended FIFRA
September 2000 Friends of the Earth ﬁnds Starlink in tacos; voluntary recalls
October–November 2000 FDA recalls various foods FFDCA
October 2000 Aventisa suspends registration FIFRA
October 2000 Aventisa petition on time-limited use in foods FFDCA
November 2000 Second Starlink SAP FIFRA, FFDCA
April 2001 Aventisa petitions for tolerance for Cry9c FFDCA
June 2001 CDC report to FDA on adverse event reports
July 2001 Third Starlink SAP FIFRA, FFDCA
SAP, FIFRA Scientiﬁc Advisory Panel.
aFor simplicity, the petitioner is always referred as Aventis, although the ﬁrst petitions were submitted by Plant Genetic
Systems. bUnder the conditions that Aventis would follow USDA NC-205 refuge guidelines for all Cry9c, that the ﬁeld corn
be used for animal feed or industrial use only, total acreage would not be more than 120,000, and the registration would
expire on 30 May 1999 (47).been reported and confirmed in a recent
study of farm workers (39), but only a small
fraction might be attributable to Cry pro-
teins. Also, bacterial enzymes used in deter-
gents reportedly caused adverse reactions in
occupational settings (40,41) and among
consumers (42) before preventive measures
were introduced. Soy proteins released to the
air at grain-loading docks caused community
outbreaks of asthma in Spain in 1985–1986
(43) and in New Orleans (44). Stability with
processing and digestion would not be rele-
vant to assessment of the potential for inhala-
tion allergenicity. 
Proteins may also have antinutritional
properties; they may decrease absorption of
nutrients. An example of this is lectins that
are present in many plants and are harmful
unless cooked. The U.S. EPA and the FDA
are aware of the existence of such proteins.
The U.S. EPA assumes that new proteins
with antinutritional activity will have
sequences that are similar to known anti-
nutritional proteins.
Recently, the NRC reviewed the regula-
tory framework for pest-protected plants by
the U.S. EPA, the FDA, and the USDA
(19). The report’s conclusion was that, while
there is no evidence that genetically modi-
ﬁed foods are unsafe, there are three theoret-
ical human health concerns that need to be
addressed: allergenicity; toxic compounds in
plants; and risk from chronic exposure. The
NRC called for long-term feeding studies of
animals to assure that chronic toxicity and
nutritional changes are not occurring.
The U.S. EPA’s health evaluation of
Starlink was exceptionally lengthy as com-
pared to other PIPs because it spanned
1997–2001, with four rounds of data submis-
sions from Aventis (1997–1998, 1999, 2000,
and 2001) (45). The analysis of the U.S.
EPA’s risk assessment will follow the conven-
tional risk assessment model (hazard identiﬁ-
cation, exposure assessment, dose–response
characterization, and risk characterization).
Through the examination of the application
of this framework, the most relevant underly-
ing assumptions and information gaps will be
discussed.
Hazard Identiﬁcation
Identity of the agent. Cry9c, the Bt toxin
present in Starlink, protects corn from lepi-
dopteran species and particularly from the
European corn borer, Ostrinina nubilalis
(Huber), a major pest of corn and other agri-
cultural crops. The commercial product
Starlink contains in its genome a modified
sequence of the cry9Ca1 bacterial gene, orig-
inally derived from strain BTS02618A of
Bacillus thuringiensis serovar tolworthi,
which was isolated from grain dust in the
Philippines (46). The bacterially encoded
protoxin is a 129.8-kDa protein; specific
modifications of the cry9Ca1 gene inserted
in Starlink result in a corn-expressed Cry9c
protein that is C-terminal truncated (elimi-
nation of all the amino acids following posi-
tion 666), that is N-terminally truncated (all
amino acids before position 43 substituted
with two amino acids, alanine and methion-
ine), and that has a replacement of arginine
with lysine at amino acid position 123 (47).
The bacterial protoxin is normally cleaved to
a 68.7-kDa active toxin whose toxicity is
normally reduced by further trypsin diges-
tion to an inactive 55-kDa fragment. The
substitution [arginine to lysine (46)] reduces
the susceptibility of the 68.7-kDa toxin to
trypsin cleavage. Therefore, the Cry9c pro-
tein expressed in corn is the active 68.7-kDa
toxin with enhanced stability to trypsin
digestion. This protein and its coding DNA
are what the U.S. EPA considers the active
ingredients of Starlink and therefore are cov-
ered as a PIP. The modification process is
summarized in Figure 2.
The concentration of the Cry9c protein
in the Starlink corn plant is lower than in
bacteria and extraction is more difficult,
making it difficult to produce protein for
toxicity testing. For this reason, the U.S. EPA
accepted microbially produced trypsinized
Cry9c as a test substance. Trypsinization is
essential as it yields a fragment of 68.7 kDa
similar to that expressed in plants. Different
post-translational modifications in the two
systems (bacteria and plant) could lead to dif-
ferent characteristics. The substitution of the
microbially produced Cry9c was validated by
comparative analyses, including SDS-PAGE
gels, Western blots, N-terminal amino acid
sequencing, glycosylation tests, and insect
bioassays. Based on these assays, the U.S.
EPA concluded that there were no biologi-
cally relevant differences between the plant
Cry9c and the microbial Cry9c produced for
the assay and that the latter could be used for
further testing. However, later data produced
by Aventis, as discussed below, raise doubts
about whether such equivalence should be
accepted for allergenicity assessment, because
Cry9c may be glycosylated in plants but not
in bacteria.
Acute toxicity. There is a long history of
safe use of Bt sprays and other agricultural
preparations (2). Apparently, no confirmed
reports of adverse effects due to Cry proteins
have emerged (48) and recent data support
this notion (49). Bt also has a relatively
benign mode of action, in terms of risks to
humans. Cry proteins, once ingested by
insects, bind to brush border membrane
receptors and insert into the membrane-
forming pores, eventually disrupting the cells
and causing massive leakage (2). These recep-
tors do not seem to exist in mammals (48).
In compliance with U.S. EPA require-
ments, Aventis supplied an acute, single-dose
toxicity study that found an LD50 (median
lethal dose) > 3,760 mg/kg in mice. In the
study, transient weight losses were seen in
three females and in no males. This adverse
effect had been seen in other Cry protein
studies and was considered insignificant.
Moreover, Aventis showed that the protein
did not display significant homologies to
known human toxins in three different pro-
tein databases. These searches found homolo-
gies only to other Bt proteins.
Allergenicity. The biochemical character-
istics of Cry9c created challenges for the
U.S. EPA in applying allergenicity assess-
ment principles that had been used to sup-
port the safety of other pesticidal proteins.
Consequently, there was a rapid evolution in
the nature of the experimental evidence that
the U.S. EPA and Aventis employed in the
effort to evaluate the potential for allergenic-
ity. The original submission (22) relied on
stability studies and sequence analysis. These
data did not rule out the possibility of aller-
genicity of Cry9c. The in vitro digestibility
study showed that Cry9c is stable for 4 hr
when exposed to pepsin digestion at pH 2.0.
Cry9c is also stable to trypsin because, as
noted above, it has been modified for
increased proteolytic resistance. The protein
was also found heat stable for 10 min at
90°C. Therefore, it was concluded that
Cry9c was likely to survive processing and
digestion and, as a consequence, to have the
potential to interact with the immune sys-
tem. The sequence analysis did not show any
homology with known allergens. However,
on the basis of its relative stability, the U.S.
EPA restricted Cry9c to animal-feed use
(23). Later, it was recognized that Cry9c
may be glycosylated in plants; many believe
that glycosylation is a feature of many food
allergens (50) and that glycosyl groups con-
tribute substantially to allergen binding
(51,52). Retrospectively, the equivalence of
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Figure 1. 1994 FDA/U.S. EPA decision tree for aller-
genicity assessment of novel proteins that do not












(not from a food source)trypsinized microbially produced Cry9c to
the plant product seems to have been ques-
tionable; in fact, bacterially produced recom-
binant allergens sometimes cannot be
validated, and eukaryotic systems may have
to be used for their production instead, at
least for aeroallergens (53).
In 1999, Aventis submitted several new
studies. One of them provided evidence, that,
when assayed against the sera of corn-sensitive
patients, Starlink was no more allergenic than
conventional corn (45). The U.S. EPA con-
cluded that people with no prior exposure to
Cry9c would not be sensitized to Cry9c, nor
was there any reason to expect that those per-
sons with allergies to native corn proteins
would become sensitized to the bacterial pro-
tein Cry9c. Thus, this study was not consid-
ered relevant to the assessment of risk. At the
same time, the company provided an animal
study that showed that Cry9c can produce
allergic reactions in the Brown Norway rat
(45). However, the speciﬁcity of this model
for allergenicity prediction has not been deter-
mined and, therefore, the U.S. EPA did not
consider the data for its assessment. A third
study indicated that Cry9c could be retrieved
from the blood of animals fed the pure pro-
tein (45), validating the earlier conclusion
that the protein could survive processing and
digestion. A fourth human study consisted of
a series of letters from workers exposed by
inhalation and possibly by dermal contact to
Starlink corn (45). This study was not consid-
ered relevant by the U.S. EPA and the U.S.
EPA’s SAP, particularly because workers
reported no allergic reactions, whereas it is
expected that 30% of a random sample of the
population would report some allergic reac-
tions (54). In summary, this new set of data
did not cause the U.S. EPA to change its
assessment of hazard. 
In November 2000, the U.S. EPA con-
vened a panel of the SAP to review its assess-
ment of the potential for allergenicity of
Starlink corn. The U.S. EPA had reﬁned its
assessment to address separately the a priori
probability of a protein to be an allergen and,
separately, the probability of sensitization
and allergic reactions in the population due
to exposure to that protein. In terms of a pri-
ori allergenic potential, the SAP provided a
new rationale for assessing the potential aller-
genicity of proteins, though it was cautious
about the validity of these criteria. The crite-
ria are resistance to acid treatment and to
protease digestion, molecular weight range,
glycoprotein, immunologic responses in the
Brown Norway rat (an element considered
by the SAP, and not by the U.S. EPA), and
presence of the protein in the bloodstream of
the rat (54). (Table 3 is a complete list.)
Based on these criteria, the SAP concluded
that Cry9c had a medium likelihood of being
an allergen. Although difficult to quantify,
the potential for allergenicity of Cry9c seems
to exceed that of other Cry proteins.
Exposure Assessment
In October 2000 Aventis presented an expo-
sure assessment for Cry9c (45). In response
to it, the U.S. EPA produced its own revised
assessment. Exposure was estimated accord-
ing to standard methods based on the USDA
national food consumption surveys and
Monte Carlo modeling; these methods allow
an estimation of distributions of exposures to
corn in various products in the diet across the
population and for various age groups. The
estimates of exposure to Cry9c protein in the
food supply also were driven by assumptions
related to patterns of use (animal feed vs.
human food), percentage of crop planted
with Starlink corn, and degree of blending
with other corn. Under the assumptions of
limited compliance and partial mixing, the
U.S. EPA concluded that the exposure to the
most highly exposed population (Hispanic
children, 7–12 years of age) at the 95th per-
centile would have been 1.6 µg/day in 2000
and 2.6 µg/day in 1999 (45).
Assessment of exposure to food allergens
is particularly challenging, in that adverse
events are the result of a biphasic process. In
the ﬁrst phase, the immune system encoun-
ters the allergen and becomes capable of
responding to it (sensitization). Later, the
sensitized immune system encounters the
allergen and allergic reaction is triggered. The
doses and the frequency of exposure required
for each process are not easily determined
(54), although it seems that sensitization may
require higher doses than the low doses that
can cause allergic reactions (45). In practice,
it is easier to identify doses that trigger aller-
gic reactions than allergic sensitization.
Nonfood exposures were not included in
the risk assessment because Aventis and U.S.
EPA (55) held the view that, because Cry9c
is expressed in plant cells, exposure through
inhalation and dermal contact would be neg-
ligible. As was mentioned earlier, this is a
questionable assumption. In addition, the
assessments did not address the potential for
cumulative exposure to other Bt proteins
along with Cry9c. It is known that many
allergens show cross-reactivity with similar
proteins, even when exposure happens
through different routes (56). If Cry9c were
an allergen, would it cause sensitization by
cross-reactivity to other Bt proteins as well,
thus making other safe products unsafe?
In conclusion, the available data would
indicate that the exposure to Cry9c in food,
under what the U.S. EPA considers reasonable
assumptions related to mixing with other grain
and food use patterns, would be 2.7 µg/day
for Hispanic children 7–12 years of age (1999;
1.6 µg/day in 2000), the group with the high-
est expected exposure. According to the U.S.
EPA, under a “high end” scenario, this would
be 17 µg/day for the 95th percentile of 7- to
12-year-old Hispanic children (in 1999; 14
µg/day in 2000) (45). This exposure might
even be lower if processing of corn reduced
Cry9c content (which is likely). This level of
exposure was characterized by the November
2000 SAP as low.
Dose–Response Assessment
There are no standard methods for doing pre-
dictive modeling of dose response for poten-
tial food allergens. There might be thresholds
for sensitization to an allergen and for trig-
gering allergic reactions in sensitized individ-
uals. Sensitization is difficult to observe in
human populations; therefore, attempts have
been made to establish thresholds for allergic
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Table 3. Criteria adopted by the U.S. EPA SAP for
assessment of allergenic potential of proteins
(November 2000).
Criterion Cry9c
Protease digestion stability Yes
Acid treatment stabilitya Yes
Immunologic response in BNRa Yes
Bioavailability in bloodstream of BNRa Yes
Probable glycosylationa Yes
Molecular weight of allergens (10–70 kDa) Yes
BNR, Brown Norway rat.
aThe method to perform this assay has not been stan-
dardized.
Figure 2. Schematic diagram of the process used
to create a transgenic Bt plant, with simplified
Starlink-speciﬁc information in parentheses.
Selection of appropriate insecticidal Bt strain
(BTSO2618A)
Isolation of gene that produces
toxin (cry9Ca1)
Modification of original sequence
(see text), insertion of regulatory





Selection of stable transgenic
Bt plant that express bacterial
gene (event CBH-351)reactions in humans, but with some limita-
tions (57). In the absence of models for
Cry9c, it has been suggested that the peanut
allergen be used as a basis for exposure com-
parison for Cry9c: peanut allergy is prevalent
in the United States and is known to cause
severe reactions (34). However, the U.S.
EPA has yet to establish a methodology for
dose–response assessment.
Risk Characterization
In November 2000, the FIFRA SAP stated: 
The likely levels of the Cry9c protein in the U.S.
diet provide sufﬁcient evidence of a low probabil-
ity of allergenicity in the exposed population
(49;p .   24). 
It is difﬁcult to establish whether the Cry9c
protein is allergenic to humans by both the
oral and inhalation routes of exposure. Cry9c
has some properties of allergens; speciﬁcally,
it is probably available for immune system
interactions. The levels in foods are probably
low, and the efforts of Aventis and other pro-
ducers to remove the product from the food
supply probably made the exposure even
lower. However, there is little established sci-
ence to evaluate the significance of these
exposure levels. The inhalation route of expo-
sure has not been evaluated at all, and the
U.S. EPA therefore did not characterize risks
of workplace exposures. On the other hand,
there is no proof that Cry9c is allergenic or
that it poses a signiﬁcant risk at all.
In conclusion, the allergenic risks are
highly uncertain. It is clear, however, that
Cry9c poses a risk, although this may not be
signiﬁcant. Given that some exposure infor-
mation was made available, the hazard-only
approach applied to other PIPs did not
apply here. However, the absence of meth-
ods for dose–response modeling made it dif-
ficult to make final judgments about the
safety of Cry9c. This situation is reﬂected in
the way the U.S. EPA has managed Starlink.
Risk Management
The risk management effort for Starlink
involved four major elements: regulatory
action, stakeholder involvement, enforce-
ment, and surveillance.
Regulatory Actions
The U.S. EPA carried out regulatory action
under both FIFRA (7) and FFDCA (8). As
mentioned above, in 1998 the U.S. EPA
granted an approval for animal feed use of
Cry9c (58). As it often had done for chemi-
cal pesticides, the U.S. EPA required market
segregation so that the Starlink corn would
not inadvertently enter the food supply (23).
Other conditions related to the registration
were buffer zones, limits on total acreage,
and resistance prevention measures. The ﬁrst
condition, buffer zones, was imposed to
ensure segregation. Theoretically, corn grown
within 660 ft of Starlink corn could produce
the toxin because of cross-pollination.
Therefore, a 660-ft buffer zone was required
to segregate Starlink corn from other corn
varieties. The second provision related to
total acreage planted as Starlink; it could not
exceed 2.5 million acres during the registra-
tion period (years 2000–2001). Other provi-
sions were related to ecologic risks.
Under the FFDCA (8), the U.S. EPA
exempted Cry9c from the requirement for a
tolerance for residues that might appear in
animal feed, as well as in meat, poultry, milk,
or eggs resulting from animals being fed with
Cry9c corn. These exemptions were sup-
ported by the SAP’s opinion that amounts of
the proteins in milk would be negligible, and
probably thus insufficient to cause allergic
reactions (54).
Stakeholder Involvement 
Broad input by stakeholders is important in
ensuring wise decisions and peer review by
the broader scientiﬁc community. The U.S.
EPA sought to involve stakeholders, and
especially scientists, in many phases of the
decision-making process. Stakeholders
included the producer of Starlink (Aventis)
and its competitors, farmers, food processors,
consumers, public interest and environmen-
tal groups, and organic farmers. During the
initial review and approval process, the prod-
uct received relatively little attention from
most of these groups. For example, no com-
ments were filed when the U.S. EPA pub-
lished the petition for a tolerance exemption
(23). After the second petition, this changed
dramatically, resulting from the appearance
of Starlink in the food supply. Other stake-
holders include allergy patients, allergists, and
other medical experts. With the exception of
the physicians who are on the SAP, this com-
munity is not yet involved. At the same time
that there are concerns, there is also hope by
some allergists that biotechnology might be a
means to reduce food allergenicity in the
future by replacing allergenic proteins in food
with benign ones (59).
Because the process of establishing and
creating exemptions for tolerances is rule mak-
ing, formal notice and comment is required.
The U.S. EPA went beyond requirements to
convene three SAP meetings to evaluate this
product and the attendant regulatory deci-
sions. Stakeholders were invited to submit
comments for review by the panel as part of its
deliberations. In summary, the U.S. EPA
process does seem to have been inclusive. 
Enforcement
Enforcement of the pesticide law is a complex
process involving two federal and various state
regulatory agencies. FIFRA (7) is enforced by
both the U.S. EPA and the state lead enforce-
ment agencies (usually the state agriculture
and sometimes the state environmental agen-
cies). However, state regulators do not rou-
tinely track shipments of corn varieties. The
FFDCA (8) is enforced by the FDA via moni-
toring of the food and feed supply for pesti-
cide residues. Food with residues in excess of
tolerance is adulterated and is not allowed to
be sold. In the case of Starlink corn, however,
there was an exemption from the tolerance for
Cry9c, and therefore there was no FDA mon-
itoring for the pesticide. In addition, no vali-
dated analytical assay was required (23). The
U.S. EPA accepted a plan proposed by
Aventis (60) that relied on the company for
enforcement and tracking sales and units of
Starlink corn. However, there was no clear
mechanism for the U.S. EPA to assure that
Aventis was doing this; the press reported that
there might have been gaps in this effort (61).
In the case of Starlink corn, the require-
ment to plant the corn only for animal feed
was difficult to enforce in the absence of
FDA monitoring, which was in turn a conse-
quence of the tolerance exemption for Cry9c.
In September 2000, a consumers’ group,
Friends of the Earth (62), held a press confer-
ence to announce its ﬁnding of Starlink corn
in food from a supermarket. What ensued
was a crisis of large proportions for consumer
conﬁdence, the food industry, the corn grow-
ers, the biotechnology industry, and govern-
ment regulators. Following this report, the
FDA ascertained the presence of Starlink in a
variety of food products containing corn,
including taco shells (5). Initially, the FDA
faced the difﬁculty of developing and validat-
ing an assay to detect the presence of Starlink
corn in foods, on an emergency basis. A
DNA-based detection method ﬁrst had to be
developed and validated and the basis for
recalls was the presence of Starlink-associated
DNA (5). Since that time, ELISA-based
methods have been developed that detect the
Cry9c protein (63). 
Were the buffer zones honored, or did
they fail to achieve their intended purpose?
There are strong indications that Starlink
corn pollinated other varieties, based on
monitoring of food items that contain not
yellow Starlink corn but other varieties of
white corn. At this time, it is not clear if this
was due to a breakdown in enforcement or a
misunderstanding of the ability of corn to
pollinate over a long distance.
Surveillance
Surveillance is an important tool, not only to
support enforcement but also to inform the
risk assessment process. There are several ways
that surveillance can be conducted for a prod-
uct such as Starlink corn, including monitoring
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and surveillance for potential human health
impacts. Collection of usage data was man-
dated by the registration (58). The FDA did
not monitor the food supply for the Cry9c
protein because the U.S. EPA granted a toler-
ance exemption, as described above. 
The FIFRA SAP in February 2000 was
asked by the U.S. EPA to address the issue of
surveillance for broader health impacts of
Cry9c. The SAP recommended animal-,
occupational-, and population-based surveil-
lance both to increase the knowledge base
for considering approval and to identify
adverse impacts (54). However, they did not
have speciﬁc recommendations for how such
surveillance would be conducted, and it is
clear that there are clinical and epidemio-
logic challenges in finding cases of food
allergy due to a novel allergen in specific
varieties of corn that compose only a fraction
of the corn in the food supply.
The FDA has received reports about
alleged new cases of allergy to corn, which
were prompted by reports in the press. The
FDA and the U.S. Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) investigated
these complaints. The FDA developed a new
ELISA to detect Cry9c antibodies in serum.
The CDC conducted an epidemiologic
investigation that included reviewing the
adverse event reports; administering ques-
tionnaires to all people who experienced
adverse health effects and manifested signs
and symptoms consistent with allergic reac-
tion; obtaining relevant medical records; and
collecting serum samples for temporary
banking. The investigation concluded that 28
people had experienced apparent allergic reac-
tions in conjunction with reporting eating
corn products that may have contained the
Cry9c protein. The FDA assay method found
that none of the CDC-submitted samples
reacted in a manner consistent with an aller-
gic response to the Cry9c protein, and the
CDC concluded that there was no evidence
that the reactions people experienced were
associated with hypersensitivity to Cry9c pro-
tein (64). The U.S. EPA SAP reviewed these
data in July 2001 and concluded that
the technical approach for the detection of Cry9c
protein and antigen-specific IgEs is limited and
cannot resolve the issue of the presence or
absence of Cry9c-specific IgE in the serum of
individuals reporting adverse reactions after eat-
ing corn (27; p. 33). 
Societal Impacts
It is too early to estimate the full impact of
the Starlink food episode. Certainly, to date,
one of the main impacts of the episode has
been to raise the level of awareness of the
American public about the presence of genet-
ically modiﬁed foods in the food supply.
The economic impacts are difficult to
estimate. The USDA has confirmed that
U.S. exports of corn have suffered. In addi-
tion, a recent newspaper article stated that 
In all, the [Aventis] official said, more than
28,000 truckloads, 15,000 rail cars and 285
barges of corn tested positive for Starlink
(65;p .417).
Although it is known that recalls can damage
companies and their brand names, it is difﬁ-
cult to establish to what extent corn and
corn products had losses in the market dur-
ing this episode. The massive testing effort
to exclude Starlink contamination had sig-
niﬁcant costs, and Aventis estimated its cost
to buy back Starlink corn from farmers to
exclude further contamination at around
$100 million (66). No doubt, there will be
other costs associated with lawsuits, rulings,
and settlements (67). It is clear that the
entire food industry in the United States will
now take a more cautious approach to these
products in the future to avoid the market
dislocation that occurred in this episode.
Federal regulatory agencies may take a
more precautionary approach in the future,
in terms of granting approvals and enforcing
limits, and certainly, the case for genetically
modified food labeling has been advanced.
“Split approvals,” or feed-use–only approvals
for biotechnology products, seem to be
another casualty of Starlink; some have
argued that segregation has been shown as
impossible (65). However, trade needs and
voluntary labeling schemes suggest that segre-
gation will remain with us, and that enforce-
ment might become tougher. From a risk
perspective, it is apparent that the difﬁculty
in containing contamination makes manage-
ment difﬁcult and places a higher burden on
the risk assessment because our capability to
remediate does seem to be low and costly.
Scientiﬁc Implications
Numerous questions remain unanswered
about Starlink corn. These are due to gaps in
our knowledge about areas such as food
allergies. Inherent in the risk assessment
process is a great deal of uncertainty.
However, in the case of Starlink corn, the
limitations in our ability to predict and
model allergenicity of new proteins pose
unusual levels of uncertainty for decision
makers. Another issue that Starlink has high-
lighted is that of the importance of control-
ling cross-pollination (65). Assessment of
this factor is important for exposure esti-
mates (45); it is also important to predict
our ability to manage a risk.
A public health and scientific question
relates to the analytic method used to assay
transgenic crop contamination, and particu-
larly whether DNA or protein should be
assayed. Because DNA seems to be safe and
its degradation pattern is probably different
from that of proteins, it would seem logical
that the protein, the potential allergenic haz-
ard, would be assayed. In fact, the exposure
assessments for Starlink concerned Cry9c
concentration. However, European regula-
tions also prescribe DNA-based monitoring
(68) as a basis for the European biotechnol-
ogy labeling efforts, which reﬂect consumer
concerns about genetically modified organ-
isms. This has some importance in driving
the technology because PIPs could be devel-
oped that express little or no protein in the
edible parts of the plants, yet would contain
the DNA sequences in every cell.
In the case of Starlink, risks to children
have been addressed in the exposure assess-
ment, and the exposure of Hispanic chil-
dren, the most highly exposed group, has
been estimated. Children are particularly at
risk of food allergy and have extensive expo-
sure to corn (49). Perhaps future assessments
should look at other exposures and at the
way children respond to allergens.
It is clear that there is no adequate occu-
pational or general population-level surveil-
lance for potentially allergenic novel crops.
For human health surveillance, most aller-
gists are not aware of the allergenic risk of
biotechnology crops, clinical tests are not
readily available, and there is no speciﬁc pro-
gram for monitoring either the general pop-
ulation or occupational groups. Although
the FIFRA SAP recommended that the U.S.
EPA consider establishing surveillance of
animals, it is not clear how the U.S. EPA
would do this. In short, the question of sur-
veillance has raised a number of interesting
questions and has provided no easy answers.
Risk Communication
Risk communication has been difficult
because the risks are so uncertain. Of the
many observers, few have been on the fence
about the risks. On the one hand, Thomas
Hoban wrote in the Washington Post: 
But what’s the startling discovery the alarm-rais-
ers have made? Hold onto your seats, folks: Our
corn, it seems, has been contaminated by—corn!
For all its ominous overtones, the StarLink inci-
dent has very little to do with science and safety
(69; p. B2). 
In contrast, an editorial published in USA
Today stated:
Two scientific reviews have failed to produce
conclusive evidence that eating the corn, called
StarLink, won’t produce allergic reactions in
infants and young children (70; p. 18A).
In reality, the health impact is not clear.
Given the scientiﬁc uncertainties, it is proba-
ble that better communication can be
achieved only as the information gap narrows. 
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tant is in involving the public and stakehold-
ers in defining goals for risk assessors and
managers. In fact, it is not clear how society
values outcomes such as sensitization or
allergy. What is an acceptable level of sensiti-
zation to foods in the population? Do sensiti-
zation and mild allergic reactions constitute
harm under the Food Quality Protection
Act’s (28) standard of “a reasonable certainty
of no harm”? There is no doubt that hospital-
ization from severe reactions would constitute
such harm.
Conclusions
In 2000, the National Academy of Sciences
(19) pointed to ways that the regulation of
pest-protected plants can be improved and
to a number of areas that need further
research. The Starlink episode contributes a
real-life example in which, in the absence of
complete scientific information, the U.S.
EPA attempted to limit the introduction of a
new genetically modified organism by
requiring that it only be used for animal
feed. The inherent weaknesses in the identi-
fication of new allergens, described by the
NRC report, largely contributed to the
uncertainties about the risks of Starlink corn
and the subsequent food crisis. In addition,
there were fundamental flaws in risk man-
agement. In the absence of monitoring by
the U.S. EPA or the FDA, perhaps it should
not be so surprising that this variety was
widely distributed in the food supply before
the U.S. EPA (and Aventis) could take
action to enforce the registration require-
ments. The credibility of this technology has
been shaken by the uncertainty in the
processes to assess and manage the risks of
Starlink corn. Now industry is moving for-
ward to attempt to construct better models
for assessment of allergenic hazards of
biotechnology, and agencies are developing
more rigorous regulatory approaches.
There are several speciﬁc areas identiﬁed
in this case study that suggest a need for
changes in future approaches to the assess-
ment and management of allergenicity of
PIPs and other genetically modified food.
First, and most obviously, there is a need for
research to develop a fundamental basis for
the assessment of risks of allergenicity. Such
research needs to be relevant to the develop-
ment of models for assessment of sensitiza-
tion and triggering of allergic responses by
proteins in food. Without a strong science
basis for the development of such models, it
will not be possible to identify levels of novel
proteins that can be considered safe for intro-
duction to the food supply. A closely related
need is fundamental knowledge about the
attributes of proteins that cause allergy. What
are the structural characteristics of proteins
that render them allergenic to humans? Is it
adequate to compare sequences and side
groups, or are three-dimensional relation-
ships more important? 
From the standpoint of risk assessment of
allergenicity, the approach of the U.S. EPA
and the other agencies needs to be broadened
to consider not only the potential for food
allergy but also the potential for workplace
and community allergic responses. Exposures
to aeroallergens in work environments may
be much greater than exposures via the food
supply, depending on where the protein is
expressed in the plant and on factors such as
stability and digestibility of the protein
(which are not relevant to inhalation expo-
sure). Likewise, communities in proximity to
farming or food-loading and processing oper-
ations may have signiﬁcant exposures to these
proteins.
From the standpoint of risk management,
it is clear that, in the case of Starlink, the U.S.
EPA trusted seed suppliers and growers to
enforce restrictions on the planting of corn
that were not maintained. Evidently, there was
little governmental oversight to assure that the
terms of the registration were obeyed. Any
governmental system for regulation of PIPs
and other genetically modiﬁed plants needs to
employ risk-management strategies that are
realistic and that can be monitored to assure
they are followed. In addition, it appears that
there may have been interbreeding between
the Starlink corn and non-PIP corn, despite
efforts to maintain buffer zones. If this proves
to be the case, it calls into question the value
of buffer zones, at least for corn. 
It is also clear that there was no way of
doing postmarket surveillance. Methods to
assay food for novel proteins (and possibly
DNA) and human sera for evidence of aller-
gic sensitization need to be available before
novel proteins go to market. Research is
needed to develop and validate ELISA assays
that can be used to confirm case reports of
adverse allergic events. 
It is becoming increasingly clear that, as
predicted by the National Academy of
Sciences report in 1987 (11), the hazards
potentially posed by genetically modified
organisms are not unique or impossible to
deal with in the context of the experience
gained with other organisms. At the same
time, it should be recognized that genetically
modified organisms might pose hazards to
health that need to be assessed and managed.
Identification of well-defined risks will
reduce concerns over every genetically modi-
fied organism or over genetically modified
organisms per se (an example could be a gen-
eral shift from DNA to protein assays for
exposure assessment). The Starlink episode is
a consequence of an assessment science that
has been outpaced by development of new
technology. Federal agencies and other
stakeholders should become involved to
guarantee that we have a broad approach to
prevention of new food allergies. Implicit in
this will be the need for an increase in
research efforts in order to gain the funda-
mental knowledge that is needed for devel-
opment of regulatory assessment methods.
Recognition of the potential for risks should
lead to better risk management that will
include refinement of monitoring methods
coupled with strong enforcement.
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